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The Military Guide for JCC SMUN 21

War, as we know it today, was radically different from the past. This document will guide the delegates through 18th-century warfare, the tactics, the strategy and the preeminent war ideologies in this era and give them an insight into a general's mind in the battlefields of the 1700s.

Principles Of War

- **Objective**, direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
 - **Offensive**, seize, retain, and exploit the initiative- Mass Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
 - **Economy of Force**, allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
 - **Manoeuvre**, place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.
 - **Unity of Command**, for every Objective, ensures unity of effort under one responsible commander.
 - **Security**, never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
 - **Surprise**, Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner in which he is unprepared.
 - **Simplicity**, prepare clear, uncomplicated plans, and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
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Introduction

The Art of War (Sun Tzu)-

The art of war, a piece of historical Chinese documentation that forms the bedrock of military study all throughout the world gives one an insight into the simple yet complex ways of war. It lays down some basic principles for any military planner to follow while taking an action, any imbalance and the plan might fail. Sun Tzu's basics included

- **Detail Assessment and Planning** (始計, 始计) explores the five fundamental factors (the Way, seasons, terrain, leadership and management) and seven elements that determine the outcomes of military engagements. By thinking, assessing and comparing these points, a commander can calculate his chances of victory. Habitual deviation from these calculations will ensure failure via improper action. The text stresses that war is a very grave matter for the state and must not be commenced without due consideration.
- **Waging War** (作戰, 作战) explains how to understand the economy of warfare and how success requires winning decisive engagements quickly. This section advises that successful military campaigns require limiting the cost of competition and conflict.

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- **Strategic Attack**(謀攻, 谋攻) defines the source of strength as unity, not size, and discusses the five factors that are needed to succeed in any war. In order of importance, these critical factors are: Attack, Strategy, Alliances, Army and Cities.
 - **Disposition of the Army** (軍形, 军形) explains the importance of defending existing positions until a commander is capable of advancing from those positions in safety. It teaches commanders the importance of recognizing strategic opportunities, and teaches not to create opportunities for the enemy.
 - **Forces** (兵勢, 兵势) explains the use of creativity and timing in building an army's momentum.
 - **Weaknesses and Strengths** (虛實, 虚实) explains how an army's opportunities come from the openings in the environment caused by the relative weakness of the enemy and how to respond to changes in the fluid battlefield over a given area.
 - **Military Manoeuvres** (軍爭, 军争) explains the dangers of direct conflict and how to win those confrontations when they are forced upon the commander.
 - **Variations and Adaptability** (九變, 九变) focuses on the need for flexibility in an army's responses. It explains how to respond to shifting circumstances successfully.
 - **Movement and Development of Troops** (行軍, 行军) describes the different situations in which an army finds itself as it moves through new enemy territories, and how to respond to these situations. Much of this section focuses on evaluating the intentions of others.
 - **Terrain** (地形) looks at the three general areas of resistance (distance, dangers and barriers) and the six types of ground positions that arise from them. Each of these six field positions offer certain advantages and disadvantages.
 - **The Nine Battlegrounds** (九地) describes the nine common situations (or stages) in a campaign, from scattering to deadly, and the specific focus that a commander will need in order to successfully navigate them.
 - **Attacking with Fire** (火攻) explains the general use of weapons and the specific use of the environment as a weapon. This section examines the five targets for attack, the five types of environmental attack and the appropriate responses to such attacks.
 - **Intelligence and Espionage** (用間, 用间) focuses on the importance of developing good information sources, and specifies the five types of intelligence sources and how to best manage each of them.
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Section I - The Kingdoms and their tactics

All kingdoms through their different culture, leadership, resources developed radically different and innovative forms of warfare. Each kingdom used them to their own advantage and had different applications. This section studies warfare through kingdoms.

The Maratha Empire

The Maratha Army was one of the most unique forces that one can ever witness, their culture of war was unlike others, almost completely void of any feelings of patriotism, it rather functioned on the basic principles of profit and loss. The Marathas laid the foundation stone in the subcontinent for the culture of Military labour, a concept practically non-existent in current times.

The Maratha army saw its establishment as a militia under the command of a brilliant leader, Shivaji. Shivaji avoided unnecessary blood loss or battles and many a times used his force as a tactic of negotiation, by intimidating the other party, one might term it as a premature form of military diplomacy. Budgetary and numerical constraints allowed Shivaji and his military leaders to experiment with their tactics and develop more efficient and less intensive forms of landing damage to the enemy. They singled down on two factors,

- (a) being fast, light and swift
- (b) using the element of surprise to their advantage, being silent and deadly

The Maratha forces revolved around these two main areas of focus and, as a result, they maintained a light infantry and a swift cavalry with relatively small horses, one from the Bhimtadi breed of Deccany horses, a crossbred of an Arabian and Indian horse breed. This allowed the Marathas to adopt a unique form of warfare, an evolution of the guerilla, The Parthian. Shivaji is known to have studied and met descendants of the great generals of the Arsacids and pulled through great inspirations from there.

The Maratha Guerrilla: The Maratha form of guerilla warfare largely depended upon relying on the cover the terrain has to offer as well as using lightly armoured and mobile forces. Since muskets were in limited supply, their tactics had to involve the enemy coming in close proximity to the forces, having laid an ambush in the direct path, contact was inevitable differentiating it from classic forms of Guerrilla warfare, in which direct contact was usually avoided and engagement was from a distance. The crux of a Guerilla lies in the element of surprise, and the Marathas were known to have mastered the same. There are primarily two types of Ambushes:

- (a) **Point Ambush:** A point ambush or deliberate ambush involves all parties in the area of engagement being a single kill zone. It involves the attack from a negligible distance onto the enemy

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- (b) Hasty Ambush: A hasty or area ambush involves the engagement with the adversary from a relatively longer range. It avoids direct contact with the enemy and uses heavier area weapons.

The Maratha armies successfully used both forms of ambush, generally in close coordination which proved to be an excellent tactic against heavy and slow moving enemy forces.

As the Maratha Empire formalized the armies slowly began to grow. This growth in the armies resulted in the numbers of Infantrymen rising rapidly. The composition of the Maratha army was rather unique. They had established and popularized a system of hiring their military instead of the soldiers serving under the banner of the Chatrapati, inventing a system of Military labour or as we know them today, mercenaries for hire. The Maratha Army had more Europeans and Arabs than it had natives from the region. The structure was rather complicated with each Sardar and Jaghirdar having their own armies and working on the basis of pay rather than allegiance, as an example if The Nizam would pay a jagir a greater amount than The Peshwa, the jagir would serve with the Nizam. The sine qua non of a good Jagirdar was if he could get his men the best pay and bloodless battlefields.

The Maratha system, and the Indian system by and large started to face problems because of the historic ideology and treatment of their forces. The Infantryman in Indian kingdoms and war ideologies was largely looked upon as a rather expendable resource and was majorly neglected with way greater emphasis being laid on cavalry. This is reflected through a game played far away from a battlefield but rather representing one, the game of chess. Developed in the subcontinent, it puts 'pawns' or 'infantryman' as the least valuable piece on the checkerboard with the 'cavalryman' or the 'knight' having drastically more importance.

This was radically opposite to the ideology of their European and British counterparts who always considered infantry as the queen of the battlefield. The difference was also in the fervour of the two armies, on one hand where the Maratha armies were fighting because of monetary gains the British troops were inspired by the ideas of saving the name of the King and fighting for the Union Jack. The redcoats were known for never leaving the battlefield and always being extremely driven whereas, the Maratha troops post the leadership of Shivaji were notorious for being called as 'business warriors' or 'baniya sipahi'.

After the shift of the actual seat of power shifted from the Chatrapati to the Peshwa took place under the Shahu's of Satara, Maratha warfare started to change. The military leadership, having fought against modern European powers, started to understand the importance of a modern and well trained Infantry. They paid more attention towards heavy armament having hired numerous Portugese gunsmiths and artillery makers. Top leadership of the Maratha military in this era was categorized by technical specialists, most of them being artillery

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crafters. The military was structured in a more linear and hierarchical manner, swore allegiance in the name of the Peshwa and was paid regularly, sometimes even including work bonuses and arrears. The army under the Peshwa's slowly modernized and subsequent victories acted as a good motivator making the army one of the most formidable in the subcontinent.

One such Peshwa was Balaji Bajirao, who is known to have never lost a battle. His fighting style represented the rapid modernizations coming into Maratha armies as well as the ideology of being fast and swift. His method of war included a swift assault into an enemy position during an unusual time, which by others would be recognized as a tactical disadvantage such as attacking at night or using unruly terrain. He focused on minimum contact and maximum damage as his primary tactic and included a fast moving cavalry with a robust infantry. His reign was considered to be a golden age for the Maratha Army.

Post the formation of the confederacy, the dynamics of the empire as well as of the armies radically changed and developed into a series of separate militias under each kingdom. The war tactics, strategy, training and equipment of each kingdom differed vastly and resulted in incoherence during many conflicts. The armies of the Maratha confederacy were more representative of an alliance like NATO rather than being the army of a singular nation. Foreign influence continued and formed the core of many Maratha armies. Certain kingdoms which possessed more resources started investing heavily into modernization and training. One such army was that of The kingdom of Gwalior, under Mahadji Scindia the kingdom's forces were lead by Beniot Leborgne from the Duchy of Savoy. Using his influence, Gwalior was able to form a formidable fighting force unparalleled by others in the region.

The Maratha armament was rather unique and again saw a homogeneous mixture of Indigenous and forigen weapons. The regular Infantry armament included 8kg, folded iron forged swords, forged iron shields. The regular cavalry equipment included mesh metal armour, caste-developed molten iron helmets, forged 8kg swords or 12 kg forged iron spears. The most unique of all small weapons was the WaghnaKh or the BaghnaKh which literally translates to a tiger claw. The weapon was easily concealable and had pronged teeth in the front, which resembled the claw of a tiger. It was concealed between fingers and used to stab the enemy with surprise. Shivaji is known to have invented and used the same to kill Afzal Khan, a major turning point in Maratha History and had great symbolic significance.

The structure of the Maratha army varied from different arms and kingdoms. Although, the general structure for different arms was:

(a) Cavalry ranks (starting with senior-most rank)

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- Sarnobat (chief of Army)(a part of the Council of Eight)
- Panch Hazari
- Hazari
- Jumledar
- Havaladar
- Bargir

(b) Infantry ranks (starting with senior-most position)

- Sarnobat (commander of Army)
- Saat (Seven) Hazari
- Hazari
- Jamdar
- Havaladar
- Nayak (or Naik)
- Paek

Organisation of the Cavalry

- (a) *Shiledar*: A shiledar brought his horse and equipment. Although organised different, even shiledar converged into the Sarnobat (chief of Army)
- (b) *Bargir*: One of the lowest rank (rank and file) cavalymen of the Marathas who were provided with horse and equipment from the State's stock

Organisation of the Infantry

- (a) *Hetkari musketeers*: Konkani musketeers recruited typically from the Konkan region, who possessed matchlocks and noted for their marksmanship
 - (b) *Mavales*: Foot soldiers recruited typically from western Maharashtra
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Mysore

Contingents of French mercenaries serving in the armies of Mysore, added to by their relations with France, closely influenced Mysorean warfare. It was based on the old style of warfare, perfected by Frederick the Great. This type of warfare has been discussed in detail in the portion on Frederick the Great. In this section, we will discuss some important features of the military structure and establishment of Mysore.

In addition to the French mercenaries, Tipu tried to use the South Asian and British Prisoners of War. They were experienced with Western Military Techniques due to their service under the EIC. These soldiers, especially the Europeans, were not heavily armed and, in fact, quite often possessed primitive weapons. The aim was to learn from them as Tipu did not trust them enough to play any significant role in his army.

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Therefore, Europeans were not given command of the regiments, unlike Daulat Rao Scindia of Gwalior, who gave Europeans control of his *campoos* in the Second Anglo Maratha War. These men deserted to the EIC.

The infantry was organised in risalas or battalions under Haidar. Each risala comprised 1000 men. With a uniform of striped tiger jackets, the infantry took part in regular drills for loading firearms. Their uniforms were designed in blue and red, with occasional sprinklings of white. Under Tipu, the infantry was organised in brigades or kushuns. Five kushuns made a kutcheri (equivalent to a division) wherein kushun had 5,000 men commanded by a sipahdar. Four Risaladars or colonels assisted him along with a naqib or adjutant. Each risaladar had under him ten jowkdars or captains.

A jowkdar commander commanded a jowk, i.e. a force of 100 men, equivalent to a company in the modern era. He had under him two sur kheil, 10 jemadars and 10 dufadars. Tipu changed the cavalry organisation to a different structure.

It had different types of regular cavalry—Siladari cavalry and kazzaks, which were predatory horses. The regular cavalry consisted of the siladari cavalry, and These were not trained in the Western discipline. The Kazaks were similar to the pindari cavalry of the Marathas. The Siladars provided their horses.

Tipu Sultan's household cavalry was similar to the paga cavalry of the Marathas. Details about artillery, the magnitude of forces and weaponry can be researched by delegates or requested through crisis notes.

Mysorean Innovation in Artillery

In the Mysore Army, there was a regular rockets corps present. This had around 1,200 men in Hyder Ali's reign. Mysore deployed these against larger Company forces during the Anglo Mysore wars. In fact, during the Second Anglo-Mysore, British ammunition stores for Colonel William Baillie's ammunition stores were detonated by a hit from Hyder Ali's rockets at the Battle of Pollilur in 1780. In the manual, Fathul Mujahidin Tipu Sultan established 200 men to handle rockets within each of the Mysore cushoons, with 16 to 24 cushoons of infantry.

Rockets were of different makes and types. They had an iron tube for holding the propellant, which enabled higher thrusts and extended range for a missile(up to 2km). The tube was a combustion chamber and contained well-packed black powder propellant. These missiles were fitted with swords and travelled hundreds of metres through the air before coming down

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with edges facing the enemy. These hammered soft iron rockets were crude, but the bursting strength of the container of black powder was much higher than the earlier paper construction, and a tremendous internal pressure was possible. In contrast, rockets in Europe could not take considerable chamber pressures, not being iron cased, and were consequently incapable of reaching such distances.

Mughals

The Mughals were one of the three Islamic gunpowder empires that utilised military innovation to become some of the strongest and stable economies of the world at that time. The Islamic gunpowder empires conquered vast amounts of territory using and developing the newly invented firearms, especially cannons and small arms, in imperial expansion from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

Structure

The Mughals maintained a small standing army. These troops were called the Ahadis, but they only numbered in the thousands. They were gentlemen soldiers who tended to take up administrative duties in the palace as well. The Mansabdar system introduced by Akbar contributed to the bulk of the army. In essence, military officers who may be large landlords, nobles or royals were in charge of recruiting and maintaining a certain quota of equestrians. This system, well managed under Akbar, eventually fell into disarray under later Mughals. This was possible to the almost infinite availability of armed peasants on the Indian labour market.

The bulk of the imperial army of the Mughals consisted, oddly, of all kinds of matchlock men, servants, tradespeople, musicians, kitchens and harems which accompanied the army. These additional persons, perhaps unnecessary to accomplish the army's purpose, hampered free and quick manoeuvring.

The head of the French factory at Kasimbazar, Jean Law de Lauriston, drew a very telling picture of the army. "In the armies of India, one merely sees colours, flags and standards, one is continuously overwhelmed by the noise of timbals, trumpets, oboes and fifes...A unit of five thousand horsemen assuredly makes more noise than an army of 100,000 men in Europe. There are nearly as many officers as soldiers, five times as many servants or traders, and at least ten times more women of all persuasions."

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Diplomacy and Intrigue

The proportion of cavalry paid and mounted by the state on state-owned horses had dropped significantly, and the forces were primarily made up of military entrepreneurs. These men served for what they could get ready to transfer themselves to the highest bidder.

Hence, due to this circumstance, conventional diplomacy and intrigue became more integrated with its aspect of war. The army's slow and showy manoeuvring, with all the superpower panoply of heavy artillery and scores of elephants, was aimed at strengthening positions at the negotiating table. This is where it differed from Napoleonic warfare. Napoleon did not hesitate to use war as a means to achieve his political objective, in fact preferring it to other tools. In Mughal era warfare, the battle could end without ever having been fought.

Communications were always kept open on all sides, and parties continued to speak terms with one another. During the months preceding the battle of Panipat, where the combined Afghan troops defeated the Marathas, the orthodox Sunni Afghan chiefs of Rohilhand wrote countless letters apologising for joining the Durrani side to the Hindu Marathas to keep their options open.

These armies could be considerably successful, however. The whole pomp and circumstance of courts and bazaars that surrounded the large Indian armies could be very instrumental in winning a battle or taking a fortress. Additionally, bombardment by artillery and other siege operations only served to strengthen one's hand at the negotiating table. Like the Ottomans, the Mughals had such massive guns that only their noise was sufficient to tear down battlements. However, the lack of mobility of heavy guns was a significant problem. This was made more difficult by the location of most Indian fortresses that made use of heavy artillery incredibly complicated. For example, Forts in Bundelkhand were protected by a broad belt of the thorny jungle. According to Wendel, even the mud forts of the Jats were too thick to be penetrated by artillery.

There was the continued use of the elephant in Indian battles. Again, it was not so much about crushing but more about out-bluffing and impressing the enemy. Elephants had started to lose their military effectiveness in the 12th century, but any self-respecting royal could not do without them. In Hyderabad and Awadh, more than 1000 elephants were held by the reigning Nawab. They were also used as platforms to provide visibility to the leaders. If the leader was killed or could not be seen, troops were likely to desert.

Of the gun ordnance

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Wherever possible, military entrepreneurs had set up their own ironworks and gunneries. The metallurgical tradition was modelled on the fine Persian damascened barrel. The gunsmiths of northwestern India were widely reputed for the fabrication of gun and musket barrels. The widespread supply of saltpetre emphasised the use of firearms. By the time of our committee, introducing the faster, more reliable flintlock musket had increased the effectiveness of European style troops and created demand for them.

The issue that cabinets will have to resolve is the usual Indian politics of permanent sedition, and ever-shifting alliances remained entirely at odds with the new military principles. Technological and tactical adoption only served to accentuate the persisting cultural and institutional dichotomy between India and Europe.

Afghans under Ahmad Shah Abdali

The Durrani Army

Nadir Shah and then the Afghans, especially under Ahmad Shah Abdali, plundered the subcontinent's riches multiple times as the Mughals declined. This portion aims to take a view of some of the unique characteristics of the army.

The backbone of the Durrani army consisted of an elite corps of about 10,000 royal slaves who had served in Nadir Shah's military. The guard of Ghulams in the Durrani army served particularly well during Ahmad Shah's Indian campaigns. They were primarily kept in reserve behind the main lines of artillery and cavalry to reinforce weak spots in the defence or charge into the already broken or dispersed lines of the enemy. Additionally, in a retreating situation, they were able to keep the men in place and check possible desertions and unnecessary flights from the battlefield.

Cavalry

While well-drilled infantry units had started to make headway, the bulk of indigenous infantry still consisted of a multitude of people assembled without rank or file; some with swords and spears or some with matchlocks (which produced a very uncertain fire), who could still not stand the shock of a body of horses. Only well-drilled European style infantry had any impact on reducing the cavalry charge.

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Innovation in Indian cavalry was more spurred by the invasions of Nadir Shah and the Afghans rather than from the Western World. Part of the Ghulam troops was equipped and trained with harsh light blunderbusses with a heavy calibre called sher-bachas. Since mounted soldiers effectively used these firearms, they probably consisted of flintlocks or Mediterranean miquelet locks, which were far more manageable and more adaptable for cavalry purposes than matchlocks.’ Their effectiveness can be understood through a contemporary Indian account of how the mounted musketeers were employed at Panipat:

“Ahmad Shah’s troops were now very hard-pressed; he summoned the Bash Ghul squadrons..The three squadrons of slaves moved from three sides and brought the vanguard of the Bhau’s army under musket fire all at once and swept away their firm stand. The Maratha vanguard retreated and mixed with the division under the Bhau himself...One squadron of slaves, numbering 2000 men, came from the right and after firing off their muskets, went away to the left. Another squadron which came from the left, after emptying their muskets, went away to the right. The third squadron which came from the front, discharged their muskets at the Bhau’s vanguard and then turned to the rear. Before the enemy could recover, these men had loaded their muskets again and arrived, the left squadron on the right wing and the right squadron on the left wing, while the squadron that had been originally in front fell on the rear. During this circular manoeuvre, they quickly discharged their muskets from one side and went away to the other. It looked as if on all four sides troops were attacking the Marathas simultaneously. The fighting went on in this manner. The Maratha soldiers who had been spread over the field drew together into a knot at their centre. It came to such a pass that these three squadrons enveloped that lakh of troopers and revolved around them.”

The bulk of the Durrani army, however, was composed of cavalry recruited from the Afghan tribes, lightly armoured and armed with lances and broadswords. Apart from the regular units of cavalry and camel corps, each Indian campaign saw a rapid increase of all kinds of irregulars, mostly adventurers and mercenaries who attached themselves to the Durrani train and who held various functions. A contemporary report claims that to each Durrani, four mounted skirmishers were attached. These forces were intended to harass and pillage the enemy and followed directly in the rear of the regulars. They were also employed as light cavalry, which tried to cut off supplies and prevent the enemy from foraging the countryside.

Notable innovations in artillery include the camel mounted gun, which, like the mounted musketeers, aimed to adapt the newly increased firepower to the mobility required in warfare. The swivel ensured increased flexibility in firing. To increase the speed of fire, the Durrani attached two gunmen to each camel.

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Section II- European Warfare: The Future

The following section talks about European warfare, both of the past and the future. There is much to learn from this as Indian warfare gradually found itself evolving to be as such.

Frederick the Great and the Old Form of Warfare

The period between 1740 and 1815 was an era that saw the perfection of the older form of warfare under Frederick the Great as King of Prussia and the entrance of a newer style which is still followed in many ways to the present day.

Developments have been focused on Europe for now. Indian warfare will evolve to incorporate these ideas gradually.

The army did reflect the state, both in India and Europe. It was divided into classes without a familiar spirit. Officers are drawn from the noble ranks whose incentive was honour, glory or ambition. Mercenaries and sepoys were drawn, as it indicates, for monetary gain. In all countries, the tendency was to recruit men who were economically the most useless or part of the degraded elements of the population. This would mean that men who could be used for grain production by their families or other productive economic activity were not usually part of the army. Hence, second or third-born sons were sent to the army.

In India, the military profession was a more sought after one with good pay. It brought better healthcare and the chance to reap higher awards which were necessary to keep soldiers in line. However, the sepoys did face some amount of separation from their communities.

The old form of warfare that is primarily applicable in committee required iron rule, making men who had no cohesion in themselves into a unified force. Soldiers could not be trusted as individuals, in detached parties or out of sight of their officers. The desertion and switchover rate for these mercenaries was alarmingly high. Hence, especially in India, diplomacy, the size of a kingdom's treasure chest and hence the use of monetary inducements determined the outcome of conflict as much as a battle did.

Additionally, the inaccuracy and short range of muskets made individual firing relatively harmless. The ideal result of military training, therefore, was to shape machine-like battalions. When engaged with the enemy, each battalion stood close to the next in a solid line, men put together elbow to elbow, about three ranks deep. Each battalion constitutes a firing machine, delivering a volley at the word of command. Two years were considered scarcely sufficient in Europe to turn a ragamuffin into an excellent professional soldier.

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For the governments in this era, with limited resources, the professional armies were expensive; each soldier was a heavy investment in time and money which was hard to replace. Great magazines of ammunition and foodstuff, which, due to poor transportation, had to be kept near the expected scenes of action, needed protection. Poor transportation was another reason; warfare was stuck in the era of sieges and forts rather than fast-paced, aggressive warfare. Mobility was limited, and hence resources do need to be developed to facilitate it. Armies and their subdivisions were immobilised near their bases, from which they could not depart more than a five days' march's distance. Even with magazines close behind them, they carried long baggage trains; hence a day's march was concise.

One drawback of the newer form of warfare was its total nature. It ended in victory or defeat and disrupted all activity inside a nation. This was another reason for the concentration of armies in heavily fortified positions, a revulsion spreading the so-called wars of religion of before. A large-scale battle between the entire armies was a rare occurrence. It was not easy for a commander to establish contact with an unwilling enemy. Even when two armies were face to face, drawing up a battle line took time. If one side chose to depart while the other formed, no complete engagements would ensure. The thing was that any margin gained on the battlefield could not easily be widened because the technique of destructive pursuit was not very well developed. This sort of pursuit did not come easily to Frederician armies, as his cavalry was likely to desert if scattered, and all his soldiers facing the lack of a passion present in more modern troops. Armies in India like the EIC's and Mysore's engaged in this pursuit for as long as possible, leading to a significant reason they were more successful than others in the region. Here, the contrast between the eighteenth century and Napoleonic battles is clear.

Hence, the olden style of warfare emphasised fortresses, the war against magazines, supply chains, and critical positions, producing limited warfare. Ingenuity in manoeuvre was more prized than courage in combat. Common military thinking in the era believed that victory could be just as bad as a defeat for one's kingdom. Frederick the Great embodied the most that could be done in such an era. Let us take a look at some examples.

Frederick invaded Silesia without warning in 1740, becoming the progenitor of what was later called blitzkrieg. In three Silesian wars, he managed to retain the coveted province, which almost doubled the size of his kingdom. Of all the states in Europe, Prussia was the most dynastic and mechanically put together while being one of the poorest in material and human resources. Policy in Prussia only came together in the mind of the king in a heavily centralised administrative system.

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The organisation of the Prussian army was an essential concern to the rulers of Prussia. It was a state that founded a polity and an economy to support its army after being born of it. In Fredericks view, a king must hold a firm balance between classes in the kingdom and between economic production and military power. " He must preserve the nobility by prohibiting the sale of noble lands to peasants or townsmen." The officer class was also essentially noble, with Frederick describing peasant or bourgeois officers as "the first step toward the decline and fall of the army". He believed a "brave colonel makes a brave battalion" and thus tried to make sure these aristocrats in charge had the necessary spirit. Even though he lived in an era of armies of non-nationals, he made a special effort in the Silesian wars to impress the importance of fighting for the Kingdom of Prussia.

He expressed rough respect for ordinary soldiers. His works detail his views on the necessity of instilling discipline in them and their maintenance. The peasant families from which they were drawn must be protected. Their land must remain their own, and as discussed earlier, only those who are not indispensable in agriculture should be recruited. While his army consisted primarily of foreigners, he was aware of the value of patriotic citizen forces. He said, "With such troops one would defeat the whole world, were victories not as fatal to them as their enemies."

Discipline and Battle Order

Prussia was famous for its drill fields. Foreign observers often expressed their admiration as battalions and squadrons performed intricate exercises with great precision. "The aim was to achieve tactical mobility, skill in shifting from marching order to battle order, steadiness under fire, and complete responsiveness to command." writes R.R Palmer. It was to create an army that would act as a perfect tool for the General's plans. The commander could have confidence in the effective implementation of his conceptions.

Furthermore, the battle was structured. "Opposing armies were arrayed according to pattern, almost as regularly as chessmen at the beginning of a game," writes R.R Palmer. Cavalry was present on each wing, and artillery found itself fairly distributed across the rear. Infantry battalions were drawn up in two parallel solid lines, one a few hundred yards behind another. Most lines were composed of three ranks, with one firing at command while the other two reloaded.

Frederick used to stick to such battle order, except at the behest of urgent tactical conceptions. The marching order of the troops, according to Frederick, should be in columns that should be arranged to allow them to present themselves as firing lines with cavalry on the flanks. Orders were strict. The instructions in a manual read, "If a soldier during an action

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looks about as if to flee, or so much as sets foot outside the line, the non-commissioned officer standing behind him will run him through with his bayonet and kill him on the spot."

Frederick's soldiers, like all others in the era, felt no great attachment to him. In 1744, he had to stop his advance into Bohemia because his army began to melt away. Elaborate rules were drawn up to prevent desertion, including but not limited to the following.

- Troops should not camp near extensive woods.
- Trusted officers should watch rear and large flanks
- Avoid night marches except when necessary
- Led by a trusted officer when going to forage or bathe

He believed, "The slightest loosening of discipline would lead to barbarisation." Officers and men had to understand that every action was the result of the "work of a single man" or, to put it more simply, "No one reasons, everyone executes."

He set a great value on cavalry, which constituted about a fourth of his army. Generally, he made use of it only for shock action as tactical units. His scouting was, therefore, inadequate. We can also note that he was not very successful in using light infantry for skirmishing and patrolling. He did not know what to do with such troops, which, being dispersed and individualistic, could not be extensions of his mind.

While he was not appreciative of the heavy investment required by artillery, and especially the disadvantage it posed to Prussia as the poorer of the states, he joined the scramble, appreciating the importance of swift movement by introducing horse-drawn field artillery for a shift of position during the battle. He insisted that artillery was not an "arm" but only an "auxiliary", inferior to infantry and cavalry. Nonetheless, he instructed his officers to avoid firing simply to satisfy the infantry or cavalry but to educate themselves in the discriminate use of ball and canister and concentrate their opening fire on the enemy's infantry to smash a hole in the enemy line to help their infantry breakthrough.

In this era, the use of a long unbroken battle would be considered butchery due to casualties following a frontal clash of two such solid lines. Hence Frederick prized the "flank attack", for which he designed a famous "oblique order". This entailed the advance of one wing by the echelons with the refusal of the other. If we ignore tactical details, the aim was to gain a quick victory by rolling up the enemy's line. In case of failure, it was to minimise losses since the refused wing could manoeuvre to cover the withdrawal of the extended wing. The discipline and henceforth mobility in Frederick's troops gave him a qualified advantage over others here. For these questions of organisation and discipline, Frederick's views remained constant over his lifespan.

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Frederick understood the capabilities of his army better than most generals understood theirs. He believed Prussia's wars should be "short and lively" and hence advocated the principle of blitzkrieg. He believed an extended conflict would exhaust the limited resources of Prussia and break down the discipline of the Prussian troops. Moreover, from preferring intense limited wars for limited means, it was of a short distance to preferring no war or a long war of low intensity. Where the war was fought was also influenced by this. He wrote in 1775, "I observe that all wars carried far from the frontiers of those who undertake them have less success than those fought within reach of one's own country." He spoke of a moral reason which is that a man feels it more just to defend himself than to hurt thy neighbour. In addition, of course, there was the obvious physical one that the provision of supplies, especially those of food, at points distant from the frontier, and the furnishing of recruits, horses, uniforms and munitions became increasingly tricky.

In his later years, he observed that Prussia could fight only a war of position as conditions on the Continent became more set in stone. With magnificent permanent magazines and vulnerable frontiers, he set a high value on fixed fortifications. These forts were "mighty nails which could hold a ruler's provinces together." Henceforth, in this era, to besiege and overwhelm such fortresses became the primary means of warfare.

Unlike Napoleon, he was not a fan of the full-size frontal battle. To his mind, the outcome of such battles depended too much on chance rather than the rational calculations and supreme planning intelligence of a general. Hence his wars gradually became, more and more, wars of position. They were leisurely and slow in achieving the primary objective yet, of course, as a war fast-paced in tactics. He wrote in 1768, "To gain many small successes means gradually to heap up a treasure."

Napoleon and the New Age

It was summer in 1805. The Coalition of some of the Great Powers breathed a sigh of relief as France's attempts at further expansion seemed to have been checked. The failure of the French Navy to control the Channel for even a few days rendered England safe. Austria, Russia had started concentrating troops, and Prussia, though neutral, had been courted by the czar and started mobilising. On that fateful day of August 23, Napoleon Bonaparte changed his military objective. The more than 175,000 men of the Grandee Armee left the coast of the Channel, and in their daring, advanced into the Rhine. They moved forward using the Danube, and to cut things short, entered Vienna of Austria without a significant battle. By

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the end of the year, Austria was detached from the Third Coalition by the Peace of Pressburg, Venetia was ceded to France, and France took its dominant place in Central Europe. The speed of French operations was unique. The emperor's handling of diplomacy and force to destroy, within a matter of months, the traditional checks and balances on the Continent were impeccable.

The Revolution raised the soldier to a leading political position. The army, its military values, gained newfound importance in French life. The most important of all the changes was a practice that lay in the military and political literature of the late Enlightenment, propounded by Frederick and Machiavelli before him as a force to be reckoned with, was a national army based on universal conscription. The resources available to the state increased multifold, adding new weight to French foreign policy.

Napoleon recognised the full potential of the revolution and the military and scientific developments of the past and fixed technical imperfections of these advancements that had inhibited their effectiveness. Clausewitz said, for a time, he gave France absolute superiority in Europe.

How it worked

Intense debate and the result of trial and error found a "mixed" system of march and attack columns, linear formations and skirmishers to be well suited to the revolutionised French armies.

The basis for Napoleonic warfare had already been laid. After the humiliating Peace suffered by France in 1763, when it lost its overseas empire, there was some serious military thinking happening. Gribeauval revolutionised artillery by introducing the innovation of parts that could be interchanged to improve fire accuracy and reduce the weight of guns to increase mobility. He created forms of artillery that remained more or less constant until the 1820s. For the first time, infantry could be closely supported by field guns in all phases of combat, giving the Grande Armée significantly more striking power.

Another significant change was the principle of *la Guerre nourrit*. Napoleon wrote, "To know... how to draw supplies of all kinds from the country you occupy makes up a large part of the art of war. Another important change facilitated this system of living off the land.

After the Seven Years War, Marshal de Broglie and Duke de Choiseul formulated a new and larger army organisation unit, the division. It developed to become a distinct, permanent, and reasonably equal part of an army, commanded by a general officer. It was strong enough to

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engage an enemy until another division reached the theatre of action. These divisions combined infantry, cavalry, artillery, and support units, moved on separate roads, responsible for their areas, and offered support. This enabled the vast army to cover great ground, which made it easier to maintain and gave them greater flexibility in movement and multiplied the General's operational choices.

One of the most knowledgeable students of Napoleonic war, Jean Colin, says, "If we take Napoleon's most brilliant projects, and compare them with the corresponding plans of his opponents, we shall hardly perceive a difference...Napoleon's contemporaries understood as well as he did the advantage of turning or outflanking the opponent." However, Napoleon himself summed it up best, his technique of using the battle as the focus and the climax of his strategy, "The art of war is simple, everything is a matter of execution."

Strategy

Hence, with the focus on the battle as a primary tool, he believed that the best course of action was always to be as strong for battle as possible, even if this meant leaving secondary bases and his communications unguarded. Unless a victim of circumstance, Napoleon never strived to achieve important policy goals with inadequate military resources. The Austrians' error committed against him in Italy in 1796 and 1797, in mobilising only a portion of the forces available, and a second after the first had been defeated and in continue, was one never committed by him. This did have its drawbacks; he found it challenging to fight limited wars with limited means.

Due to his duties as both head of state and commander in chief, war was effectively integrated as a tool of diplomacy, and his statesmanship was evident in the way he dealt with it. Even when he could not prevent the formation of alliances against France because his intentions were too explicit for everyone not to recognise them-he still played on the specific interests of one or the other partner to delay the linkup of Allied forces. In December of 1805, having seduced Prussia into neutrality, he defeated the Austrians and the Russians. In 1806, England and Russia were mere spectators as the Prussian army was destroyed.

Even if he could not prevent the conjunction of two or more allies in the same theatre, he would use the opportunities provided by the political and operational difficulties of divided command. As he wrote, "One bad general would be better than two good ones." For example, in 1796, in a campaign to make his reputation, he interposed his armies between the Sardinian and Austrian forces to prevent their junction. This led to the strategy of what some call the central position, operating on the interior lines, wherein the first knocked the Sardinians out of the war and then turned on the Austrians.

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Napoleon believed that the best way to reach whatever political goal he had was to reduce his opponent's power of resistance as far as possible. This was the main idea of the battle as a focus and climax set of ideas. The defeat of an enemy's main armies was the main goal since the capture of fortresses, the occupation of terrain or capitals could not have the same impact on the adversaries war-making potential as much as the defeat of his army. A total defeat created new favourable situations- further losses militarily, withdrawals and politically by forcing the opposing government into negotiations under unfavourable circumstances.

To force a battle, a common idea of thought was to push a strong army so far forward that it could not be ignored and had to be fought. Napoleonic strategy's result was to bring about the threat or reality of the decisive battle. A campaign may be launched from or occupy an interior position that would permit a piecemeal reckoning of the adversary's forces or a manoeuvre against the rear that enveloped the enemy's position and threatened his lines of communication. For example, with Prussia, in a war he did not want to fight, his plans still consisted of mobilising the most potent force possible and pushing towards Berlin. If Prussians took the offensive, they would be diverted by the need to protect their capital and French numerical superiority and greater mobility would ensure a positive result. He also made sure to push from the south to separate the Prussian forces from their capital, supply bases, and the Russian border as a push from the west would have launched Prussia towards possible Russian assistance.

If his opponent were superior in numbers, Napoleon would wage a frontal battle, preferably on terrain divided by such natural obstacles as streams that would inhibit the enemy's lateral movements. At the same time, his forces were in a solid defensive position, with as many as could be spared kept in reserve. Once the enemy was committed along the front, the masse de rupture of the reserves would attack one part of the front. Once it broke through, it would move against the flanks and rear of other sectors. With forces equal to or superior to those of the enemy, he would attempt to outflank him by extending his front or launch an attack on his flank with a different corps. Because of its penetration, the flank attack offered more incredible results but was also harder to pull off successfully since communication and coordination between units that were farther apart than a few miles was unreliable. Hence he chose to usually employ frontal encounters, which were easier to control and offered less uncertainty. Other generals were as aware of Napoleon of such attacks. The real difference here lay in psychological attitude.

Even after the above example, we must note that while Napoleon sometimes started on the defensive to get his adversary to overcommit, he preferred the attack. He disliked purely defensive battles as he knew the value of the initiative and feared its loss. It is a simple point, but its relevance cannot be overemphasised for Napoleonic warfare. This, combined

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with his significant exploitation of human emotions, made him the most outstanding soldier of the age. His charisma and the belief in his superiority was not just of his troops. French troops miles away from where he was were ordered to shout "vive l'Empereur!" to make the enemy believe he was facing them. Wellington described his presence as the equal of an additional forty thousand soldiers.

I must stress, delegates, that the lack of a revolution is not a reason to be dismayed. Following its defeats under Napoleon, Prussia revealed that the most radical military innovations do not need to be backed by a social and political revolution and could be imposed and maintained by stable, highly authoritarian regimes. The main exception to the process of modernisation was Britain, who suffice to say, did not require it due to its reliance on the British Navy and its allies along with its generally limited operational theatres.

In fact, in Prussia, there was an introduction of a new type of general staff. One whose members were assigned to various subunits and were able to act with a measure of independence in the service of an overall strategic idea. This constituted an early and still primitive solution to the communication gap.

Carl Von Clausewitz

Carl was born in Burg near Magdeburg in Prussia in . The son of a low-ranking Prussian officer, he was educated as a cadet in the army, and was on active military service in his teens, fighting against France in the French Revolutionary Wars. He studied military history under Gerhard von Scharnhorst, whom he far surpassed intellectually, developing his knowledge of the tactics employed in the great European conflicts of the eighteenth century. He met Marie, Countess von Brühl, who became his wife.

Clausewitz took part in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt in, when Napoleon defeated Prussia, and was briefly imprisoned by the French. On his release he joined Scharnhorst's commission into the Prussian military, instituting wide-ranging reforms. He witnessed the battles of Smolensk and Borodino during Napoleon's – campaign, fighting briefly on the Russian side, which provided valuable insights for his future work. Clausewitz became the administrative director of the Military Academy in Berlin in ,and it was there, between the years and, that he wrote On War.

Clausewitz's theories were majorly based on three principles

- **War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will**, through this point, Clausewitz aims to convey that war is majorly a negotiation tactic, used to make our enemy follow and comply with our terms.

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- **War as a function of the trinities**, in Clausewitz's view, three trinities formed the bases of war, hatred and enmity (people's passion), the role of luck and chance in war, and lastly the will of the authority and convergence of politics with military.
- **How to pursue victory**, Clausewitz was of firm belief, that it had to be fought and led from the ground, the vision should be clear and all plans should revolve around a clear objective, to pursue victory.

